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Social Mechanisms Governing the 
Informal Transactions between 
Russian IT Managers
While the previous chapter dealt with the contents of Russian man-
agers’ informal transactions (e.g. information, advice, money), this 
chapter describes the social mechanisms regulating these transactions. 
Instead of trying to cover all such mechanisms, the chapter focuses 
on reciprocal obligations, brokerage, and mixing of professional and 
personal spheres of life, that is, mechanisms that are supposed to create 
continuity in relationships and enlarge personal networks by introduc-
ing new members.1
Reciprocal expectations in Russian managers’ transactions
The norm of reciprocity vs. the importance of socializing
It seems natural to think that a given favor evokes an expectation of 
a counter favor, thus contributing to the maintenance of the network 
tie. In his article The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement (1960), 
sociologist Alvin Gouldner explains this expectation by the existence of 
a universal, generalized norm of reciprocity.2 Gouldner considers reci-
procity to be as universal and important in cultures as the incest taboo, 
though he admits that its ‘concrete formulations’ may vary according 
to time and place.3 Moreover, the norm may also differ within one 
society according to the status of participants or certain other condi-
tions. Gouldner also mentions how the norm may function differently 
to some degree in different cultures, and also leaves room for the lack 
of reciprocal obligations:
Relations with little or no reciprocity may, for example, occur when 
power disparities allow one party to coerce the other. There may also 
be special mechanisms which compensate for or control the tensions 
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which arise in the event of a breakdown in reciprocity. Among such 
compensatory mechanisms there may be culturally shared prescrip-
tions of one-sided or unconditional generosity, such as the Christian 
notion of ‘turning the other cheek’ or ‘walking the second mile’, the 
feudal notion of ‘noblesse oblige’, or the Roman notion of ‘clemency’.
(Gouldner 1960: 164)
Edwina Uehara (1995) notes that the formulation of Gouldner’s norm 
is very general. In actual interaction situations, people have to make 
concrete decisions about, among other things, how much, when, and 
how to reciprocate
[O]ur expectations as to how and when we can ‘legitimately’ meet 
our reciprocity obligations are quite diverse, and some relationships 
afford more flexibility in this regard than others. For example, in 
relationships where indirect and/or delayed reciprocity is permitted, 
we are afforded a relatively wide degree of latitude in meeting reci-
procity obligations.
(Uehara 1995: 487)
We asked about the existence of reciprocal expectations and their 
actual realizations in concrete interaction situations among our Russian 
respondents with the help of two questions. The first question consid-
ered the possibility of a ‘free lunch’, and the other the possibility of an 
unreciprocated favor. The English expression ‘there’s no such thing as 
a free lunch’ was translated into the Russian saying ‘there is free cheese 
only in a mouse trap’ (besplatnyi syr tol’ko v myshelovke).4
In general the respondents admitted that doing a favor for someone 
created a need for a counter favor: 
Q: There is a saying ‘there is free cheese only in a mouse trap.’ To 
what extent do you agree with this? 
P4: Basically, of course, I agree. If someone does you a favor, you 
suppose as a silent agreement that you are ready to do some kind 
of a reciprocal favor. If not now, then in the future. In my opinion 
these are normal human relations (eto normal’nye chelovecheskie 
otnosheniia)
(general director, p4)
Some of the respondents, however, disputed the whole principle by 
criticizing the barter logic inherent in our question (and in Gouldner’s 
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norm). Instead, they related the giving of favors to a broader process of 
obshchenie – building and maintaining personal networks through com-
municating and socializing:
Q: Generally when you do someone a favor or someone does you a 
favor, do you expect something in return?
P6: No, I don’t. If I do a favor, I don’t do it on the basis of barter. 
But I have noticed that very often some contacts will overlap. They 
probably won’t bring concrete results right away, but perhaps later. 
But this is similar to human communication (srodni chelovecheskomu 
obshcheniiu). I am not giving you an interview because I expect some-
thing in return. Absolutely not. I give you an interview because it 
won’t take me much time. I can grant you half an hour. If this helps 
you, as I understand, why not?
(marketing director, p6)
This quote echoes the words of Luc Boltanski in a recent interview 
(Basaure 2008). Boltanski noted how expecting no reciprocity might 
seem like an unreachable ideal but ‘I think in daily life it happens very 
often, because it would become completely impossible, if anyone would 
constantly calculate what he is doing and what is being done for him, as 
equivalencies must permanently be evoked’ (Basaure 2008: 7, translated 
by M. L.). 
The quote may be interpreted as a criticism of the economic-rational 
perspective implied in the question, which considers the individual act 
of exchange as abstracted from its actual context. The reciprocal expec-
tations do not, for this respondent, figure as a motive for action or relate 
to individual actions but rather to the nature of the ongoing ‘human 
communication’ (cf. Gronow 2008). In a similar manner, another of 
our respondents (general director, p4) justified his helping others out 
without reciprocation as ‘normal human communication’ (normal’noe 
chelovecheskoe obshchenie). 
Alexey Yurchak (2006: 148–51) has paid attention to the importance 
of obshchenie, which has no adequate equivalent in English:
It refers to ‘communication’ and ‘conversation’, but in addition 
involves nonverbal interaction and spending time together or being 
together. It is different from just ‘hanging out’ with friends, as used in 
the United States, because it always involves an intense and intimate 
commonality and intersubjectivity, not just spending time in the 
company of others. The noun obshchenie has the same root as obshchii 
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(common) and obshchina (commune), stressing in the process of inter-
action not the exchange between individuals but the communal space 
where everyone’s personhood is dialogized to produce a common 
intersubjective sociality. Obshchenie, therefore, is both a process and a 
sociality that emerges in that process, and both an exchange of ideas 
and information as well as a space of affect and togetherness.
(Yurchak 2006: 148)
Quoting Vail and Genis (1988: 69), Yurchak (2006: 148) notes how 
obshchenie as a cultural practice intensified and evolved into a dominant 
pastime during late socialism. Though he remarks that in present day 
Russia people are regretting the diminishing chances for obshchenie, our 
interviews testify to its continuous existence and importance.
Indications of the importance of this practice were the frequent 
cases of obshchenie that took place not only among the Russian IT profes-
sionals, but also between our native Russian interviewer and the respond-
ents. The interviewer was advised to record her observations about the 
respondent and the interview situation on tape after each interview 
session. As a result, our ‘meta-level data’ of the interviewer–interviewee 
encounters contain several instances of the following type: 
[The respondent was a] very sociable (obshchitel’nyi) person. The con-
versation took place in the office. The respondent offered me coffee 
and introduced me to his partner. After the interview we still talked 
about some topics that were of interest t0o both of us. For example, 
the respondent has a very wide circle of sociality (krug obshcheniia).
(interviewer’s comment on the interview 
with general director, p3)
This quote illustrates not only an encounter between two individual 
persons, but a coupling of two personal networks (krug obshcheniia) 
through the commonly shared practice of socializing and communicat-
ing. Note that the interviewer uses the word ‘conversation’ (beseda) in 
addition to ‘interview’. The conversation ended with the respondent’s 
invitation to the interviewer to join his personal network on a social 
networking website. Despite the time constraints of our respondents, 
these kinds of instances of socializing took place frequently after the 
formal interview had ended:
During the conversation after the interview it became clear that 
the respondent is studying English and has been in English courses 
abroad. He regretted not being able to talk ‘kitchen English’ because 
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of the lack of occasions to practice. During the informal conversation 
after the interview we moved to a first-name basis (my pereshli na ty), 
and talked about the respondent’s relationship to the city.
(interviewer’s comment on the interview 
with development director, p5)
The importance of obshchenie was also key to understanding the inter-
views: our Western interview questions about the importance of recip-
rocating a given favor were often answered with examples emphasizing 
the importance of obshchenie. Metaphorically speaking, when asked if a 
person donating seeds to a gardener would expect a counter gift, many 
respondents suggested that it was more important to communicate and 
socialize with the gardener. The contact established might or might not 
bear fruit in the future:
I presume that if I help someone, I can also turn to this person with 
some questions. But I do not think at all that there is some kind of 
unavoidable principle of equality, some kind of calculation like ‘I 
helped you once, you will help me later’.
(development director, p17)
Many respondents agreed with the norm of reciprocity in principle but 
nevertheless told several examples of favors they had done without 
expecting something in return. First, some examples of unreciprocated 
favors considered cases where resources had been distributed so unevenly 
between the participants of the exchange that both understood that reci-
procity was not an option (cf. Ledeneva’s ‘regime of status’, 1998: 150–2):
Sometimes I can do a favor understanding that I will never get anything 
back. Because the person, for example, cannot give me anything.
(PR manager, p19)
Second, the respondents analyzed various factors related to situational 
contexts affecting reciprocal expectations:
I don’t know why you should necessarily do others a favor in order to 
be able to ask for one. If I ask you to bring me a cup of coffee, what 
reasons do you have to refuse? 
Q: None
P5: You can bring it. This is an example. If it is not difficult and does 
not require a lot of work. You just do it. Another variant is that you 
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have no reason to refuse but you feel lazy. And you will say that I do 
not feel like it. This will also be a variant of communication (eto tozhe 
budet variantom obshcheniia) (…) A wish is simply a wish and not a 
command. One cannot count on that what you want will be done. 
But one can hope for it.
(development director, p5)
Third, several respondents stressed the dependency of the reciprocal 
expectations on the nature of the relationship. According to them, 
friendship relations, for example, had different rules than business 
relations in terms of reciprocity (see the end of this chapter for a more 
detailed account on friendship):
Q: They say that there is free cheese only in a mouse trap. If you do 
someone a favor, you will expect something in exchange, some kind 
of help or favor. Do you agree with this saying? 
P13: No I don’t. It does not work in friendship relations (v druzheskikh 
otnosheniiakh). In them everything is different, otherwise they would 
not be friendship relations but something completely different.
(general director, p13)
In sum, although the majority of the respondents agreed with 
Gouldner’s norm of reciprocity in principle, many told examples of 
situations where they themselves had given help without expecting to 
be reciprocated; some denied it altogether; and others refined the norm 
in several respects, pointing to, among other things, the importance of 
obshchenie. Even a professional encounter between the interviewer and 
the interviewee could be transformed into a coupling of their personal 
networks through obshchenie. 
These denials and variations of the norm of reciprocity suggest that, 
in addition to reciprocal obligations, other social and moral mecha-
nisms were at work in the personal networks of our respondents. In 
the next section the denials of reciprocity are discussed based on Alena 
Ledeneva’s (1998) work on the ‘Russian economy of favours’ already 
addressed in the previous sections.
Denials of reciprocity as misrecognition
Ledeneva (1998: 141) analyzes reciprocal obligations in blat exchanges 
in a manner that is relevant to the current study.  According to her, the 
particular nature of blat favors has an impact on reciprocal expectations 
since it can be located between gift and commodity exchanges. On the 
112 Networks in the Russian Market Economy
one hand, blat favors are different from commodity exchanges because 
they bear the personal stamp of the donor, but on the other hand blat 
favors may also be distinguished from gift exchanges because they hap-
pen upon request. Consequently, blat is protected from the ‘compulsion 
of the gift’ and imposed generosities. 
To find a way to deal with the complexity of reciprocal obligations in 
blat exchanges, Ledeneva (1998: 142–4) refers to Luc Boltanski’s distinc-
tion between the ‘affective regime’ and the ‘regime of justice’. To sum-
marize Ledeneva’s presentation, which draws on Luc Boltanski’s lecture at 
Princeton in 1992: in the ‘regime of justice’ parties search for equivalen-
cies – or a common point of reference – to manage disputes whereas in the 
‘affective regime’ people shove aside all calculations of equivalencies.5
Based on the theorizing of Boltanski and Thévenot, Ledeneva herself 
constructs three different ‘regimes of reciprocity’: the regime of equiva-
lence, the regime of affection, and the regime of status, between which 
the exchange partners may switch depending on the situation. In the 
regime of equivalence, the reciprocal expectations are most explicit since 
the focus is on the potential utility of the exchange partner. In the regime 
of affection participants stress the relationship itself rather than counter 
favors, and are bound by personal ties irrespective of their involvement 
in blat transactions. Finally, unlike the two other regimes, the regime 
of status is asymmetrical and can follow the pattern of patron–client 
relationships. This regime is affected by the status, power, and authority 
of the participants in blat exchanges and shows how reciprocal expecta-
tions may be irrelevant since some favors cannot be paid back even in 
principle (Ledeneva 1998: 142–52).
While Ledeneva’s trichotomy sheds light on various aspects of the 
reciprocity of blat exchanges, it also contains problems, since else-
where in her book she analyzes blat transactions with the help of Pierre 
Bourdieu’s notion of misrecognition (méconnaissance) in gift transactions. 
According to Bourdieu, the temporal delay between the gift and the 
counter-gift enables parties to create an illusion of the non-reciprocal 
nature of the gift. In reality, the reciprocal obligations do exist, and only 
the collective participation in the ‘misrecognition game’ makes it pos-
sible to conceal this objective fact.
In blat exchanges, however, the misrecognition game was incomplete, 
because people were able to recognize an exchange of favors as blat 
when it was conducted by others, but unable to do this when they were 
themselves involved in blat transactions: 
The complexity of the blat ‘misrecognition game’ cannot be fully 
grasped by Bourdieu’s concept of misrecognition, where even being 
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outside of the gift exchange transaction, a member of a community 
would admit that it is a gift that has been given. As not all individu-
als accept the internal rhetoric of blat and recognise it indicates that 
this did not endanger the foundation of community – that is, there 
was no universally shared sense of ‘honour’ involved in blat.
(Ledeneva 1998: 59–60; see also Ledeneva 2008: 129–30)
The disclosing of the objective truth underneath the respondents’ dis-
course in the misrecognition game seems to be at odds with the theory 
of Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), according to which ‘[t]he regime in 
which one makes calculations is no more true, no more real, than the 
regime in which people inhibit their calculation abilities’. However, 
according to Ledeneva – who illustrates this regime mainly with 
examples of friendship ties – in the regime of affection ‘the feelings of 
affection disguise blat relations’ and ‘the rhetoric of friendship tends to 
conceal mutual obligations’ (Ledeneva 1998: 148–9). If these mutual 
obligations are not obeyed, the real state of affairs is revealed:
But in fact, if the balance in the relationship is broken, if one takes 
offence and feels that the code of friendship has been violated, the 
relationships are likely to slip into the regime of equivalence.
(Ledeneva 1998: 149)
In other words, it looks as if in Ledeneva’s trichotomy the regime of 
affection would be a somewhat unstable discursive layer, under which 
the ‘objective reality’ of reciprocal obligations is to be found – as in 
Bourdieu’s misrecognition game. 
Denials of reciprocity as references to shared moral principles
Instead of applying the notion of misrecognition to denials of reciproc-
ity, this section follows the lead opened by Luc Boltanski and Laurent 
Thévenot (2006) in their book On Justification. Economies of Worth 
([1991], 2006).6 From this perspective, the respondents’ reflections on 
reciprocity may be considered ways of justifying their actions by refer-
ring to shared moral principles. 
Our respondents’ appeal to moral principles in the interviews con-
cerning their professional activities suggests that economic relations 
are far from being emptied of moral considerations. Moreover, it shows 
how economically relevant actions may be justified by referring to 
moral principles unrelated to the market logic of competition. Finally, 
respondents’ replies reveal how reciprocal obligations may also be 
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shoved aside completely in the name of non-instrumental friendship 
(Boltanski 1990; Kharkhordin 2005, 2009). 
In the remaining text of this section, justification theory is first 
described in short and then, in the next section, applied to the Russian 
managers’ interview data.
The basic idea of justification theory is that the normal, conventional 
course of action – for example, running a business – tends from time to 
time to drift into a dead end. Justification theory focuses on these ‘criti-
cal moments’ – crises, conflicts, and disputes – which force the disagree-
ing parties to argue and justify their actions by referring to ‘a common 
good’ recognized and accepted by both parties.7 
In order to settle the dispute, the parties have to establish a principle of 
equivalence, against which the arguments presented in the dispute can be 
evaluated, and the ‘worth’ (grandeur) of the disputants can be measured. 
Boltanski and Thévenot describe six different orders of worth, each 
of them referring to a different principle defining the ‘worth’, ‘size’, or 
‘greatness’ (grandeur) of the disputing parties. They distinguish six com-
mon worlds based on these principles and on the beings (persons or 
things) that inhabit these worlds.8
First, in the market world, the greatness (grandeur) of an actor is 
defined by wealth and ultimately measured by markets. The greatness of 
a physician in this world, for example, could be measured by her com-
mercial success in medical business. Second, in the industrial world, to 
continue the example, the same physician may be valued – irrespective 
of her commercial success – by her efficiency and measured in concrete 
terms, for example, by the number of patients handled per day. Third, 
in the domestic world, the greatness of the physician is evaluated by her 
position in the system of mutual dependency. Valued or ‘worthy’ in 
this world is one’s trusted family doctor who has been treating all the 
members of the family for years and with whom one can always jump 
the queue to get an appointment. Fourth, in the civic world, a doctor 
is evaluated by her willingness to treat all patients equally as citizens. 
Fifth, in the world of fame, a great person would be a well-known media 
figure (such as Dr. Phil), whereas in the inspired world such a figure 
would be a genius surgeon who is the only one able to conduct certain 
operations because of her unique, God-given artistic capabilities.9
In this book the focus is mostly on the domestic and market orders 
of worth and the tensions between them. It is important to note that 
economic relations are not to be identified with market worth since a 
firm, for example, may be analyzed as a ‘compromising device’ between 
the market and industrial worth (Thévenot 2001). 
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The originality of justification theory is that none of these moral 
orders are tied to particular social groups or superior to the others. 
The argumentation which is valid in one world may be out of place 
in another. Moreover, justification depends on the situation. The same 
person may, in the course of one day (or one hour), refer to different 
orders of worth to justify his actions.10 
Since the orders of worth are equal, there is no privileged position for 
a critical sociologist à la Bourdieu – or any other outside observer. From 
this perspective the misrecognition game turns out to be part of the 
project that tries to reveal a deeper truth lurking behind the backs of the 
actors. Justification theory, on the contrary, analyzes the interviews as 
examples of the competence of actors to justify their actions. 
In the next section we turn to the analysis of the empirical data, try-
ing to follow the methodological principle of justification theory as 
summarized by Nicholas Dodier (1993: 567):
[L]et us take peoples’ justifications seriously and study them in their 
plurality; let us observe how explanations are displayed, and accu-
mulate the accounts people give of their actions; and let us examine 
the sense of justice they thereby express.
Reciprocity and the domestic ethics of helping others out
Though it is plausible to think of reciprocal obligation as a universal 
phenomenon in line with Alvin Gouldner, it is similarly likely that the 
actual expectations and forms of reciprocity are likely to vary between 
cultures. Edwina Uehara’s review of the North American studies of reci-
procity helps to place the observations of the previous section into a 
comparative context.11 Uehara’s goal was to find out to what extent:
(1) [people] feel obliged to return support or assistance received from 
others and to act on this obligation; and (2) tend to resolve/give 
meaning to the reciprocity ‘balance’ in their relationships in a man-
ner that avoids the interpretation that they are ‘overbenefiting’.
(Uehara 1995: 488)
Uehara concludes that the studies reviewed support the idea of the 
existence of an obligation of reciprocity. But unlike it is postulated by 
the equity and utilitarian theories, in Western countries people seem in 
their reciprocal behavior rather to try to overbenefit a favor received –
 that is, to pay their debts with interest – than to strive for balance or to 
take advantage of their exchange partner. Uehara’s results are indicative 
116 Networks in the Russian Market Economy
of a context where the principles of market worth such as self-reliance 
and competitiveness are particularly valued:
All in all, the normative ‘deck’ [in Western countries] appears to be 
heavily stacked against the individual in need of assistance from 
others.
(Uehara 1995: 499)
Justification theory does not, however, confine various orders of worth 
to specific cultures, but sees them rather as universal points of refer-
ence whose weight may nevertheless differ depending both on cultural 
context and situation. 
In Russian society, for example, reciprocal expectations exist in a con-
text where – due to the Soviet heritage and probably the much longer 
domestic tradition of the Russian village community – people are bound 
to each other within a system of mutual dependency and thus accustomed 
to turning to each other for help in various daily life problems. Though 
this ‘domestic’ idea of helping others out is now being challenged by the 
introduction of market-based principles in post-Soviet Russia, it has not 
disappeared. More importantly, it can be referred to even in the context 
of an interview concerning business-related favors, as the following quote 
from a Russian owner of a successful IT company shows: 
T: How and why does this [system of mutual favors] work? 
P1: Because mother was reading us fairy tales in childhood. In the fairy 
tale Mashen’ka is running on a field, where there stands an oven. ‘Take 
the pie out, it is burning,’ the oven says. Mashen’ka takes the pie out 
of the oven. Then an apple tree asks: ‘Shake me.’ Mashen’ka shakes the 
tree. But the bad girl just runs ahead and does not help anyone. And 
she will end up badly. This is what we were taught in childhood, to 
share things with everyone, to cooperate, to help.
(general director, p1)
The respondent is referring to a Russian fairy tale where the good girl 
Mashen’ka is helpful and gets rewarded at the end while things end 
up badly for the girl who does not help out other creatures. Many of 
Ledeneva’s (1998) respondents recognized the same ‘obligation to help’. 
Like our respondent quoted above Ledeneva herself describes this phe-
nomenon, referring to another Russian fairy tale with similar contents:
As in the fairy tale about Ivan-the-Fool who, despite his grand mis-
sion to liberate Helen-the-Beauty, helped different creatures on his 
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way, sharing food with them and saving their homes or lives. He 
would have had no chance in his fight with the Deathless (in Russian 
folklore a bony, emaciated old man, rich and wicked, who knows the 
secret of eternal life), but because every creature returned his favour, 
in their small ways in particular moments, in the end with their 
assistance he managed to kill the Deathless and marry the girl.
(Ledeneva 1998: 164–5, footnote 9)
Though these quotes may be read as examples of the reciprocal return-
ing of favors, as Ledeneva remarks, here they will be interpreted as 
referrals to the importance of helping out others within a system of mutual 
dependency. Without this principle things will turn ugly for everyone: 
the pie will get burned and Mashen’ka will suffer. It is because of this 
systemic importance of mutual dependence that the one helping others 
out will finally be rewarded. 
One of Ledeneva’s respondents describes this domestic principle from 
a comparative perspective, contrasting it to the ‘Western’ world plagued 
by competition and self-reliance.
Western people, in contrast to us, are very independent. They rely 
on themselves and do not fancy helping out or accepting help 
from others. Russians assume that they can always ask for help and 
will help themselves. I am sure that if I ask I will be helped. And 
the other way around. If I am asked, I drop everything and help the 
other person, because I can imagine myself in his place. Indifference 
or refusal is a psychological trauma. I try not to refuse, giving out 
everything I can.
(Ledeneva 1998: 163)
This interview quote could be read as a stereotypical Russian self-
identification vis-à-vis a mythical and idealized Western business life. 
However, instead of this kind of interpretation or trying to find out 
whether the respondent above in actual fact helped others, in this 
text these kinds of expressions will be considered moral justifications of 
action.
In line with the evidence on the importance of mutual help drawn 
from our interviews, Vadim Radaev (1998: 15) describes ‘the ethics 
of implicit contracts’ based on the surveys conducted among Russian 
managers and entrepreneurs at the end of the 1990s. When asked if 
the entrepreneurs were willing to loan a considerable sum of money 
to a firm of their regular partner who was confronting financial 
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difficulties, only one out five entrepreneurs responded negatively. Of 
the respondents, 27 percent would not require any interest, 25 percent 
would loan money on low interest, and only 3 percent on market interest 
(25 percent chose the option ‘difficult to say’).
Though the willingness to give discounts to trusted partners was 
probably partly related to the exceptional circumstances of the 1990s, 
by referring to the ethics of helping out some of our respondents still 
recognized the mutual dependence of people – and particularly the 
dependence between the members of one’s own personal network. 
Recognizing and sharing this moral principle means, first, that in Russia 
it is easier to ask for help and favors than in a context emphasizing 
competition and self-reliance. Second, it means that a request for help 
is more difficult to turn down in Russia by saying that ‘it is not my 
business’.
At the risk of exaggeration, one may claim that while asking for help 
is interpreted in ‘Western’ culture as a sign of weakness, in Russia turn-
ing down a request for help from one’s network member is a sign of rude, 
uncivilized behavior. One of our respondents (development director, 
p5), for example, having criticized at length the barter logic implied in 
our question on reciprocity, summarized that the topic of discussion 
was related, rather than to the professional sphere, ‘to the worldview’ 
(eto skoree vsego otnositsia k mirovospriiatiiu).
If this hypothesis is valid, we can better understand the replies of our 
respondents about the variations and denials of reciprocity as indicative 
of a context in which ‘owing favors’ is common and allowed. Where 
problems are often solved ‘with a little help from my friends,’ the pres-
sure to reciprocate may be less stringent than in a context stressing the 
individual’s capacity to do it ‘my way’. 
If we think of the reciprocal expectations as a cohesive force in 
networks (as a kind of ‘social glue’), the pressure on self-reliance and 
immediate reciprocating in fact tries to dissolve this glue by a quick 
and full return of favor.12 The weaker pressure on reciprocation goes 
hand in hand with the tendency to help others out, the importance of 
obshchenie, and the maintenance of network ties.
Nevertheless, referring to the ethics of helping out does not mean 
that it is applied in practice automatically in all circumstances. Instead, 
its application is likely to depend on the specific situation and person. 
Rather then describing Russian IT professionals as altruistic actors 
always ready to sacrifice their own interest, the analysis of this section 
has tried to illustrate the tensions between the new market-based logic 
emphasizing independence, competitiveness, and self-reliance, and the 
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traditional domestic logic of helping out others in a system of mutual 
dependency.
Brokerage
Q: Have you sometimes exchanged useful contacts through your 
acquaintances? For example, have you recommended your acquaint-
ance who can help you with a question you cannot?  
P6: Of course. It is an element of everyday communication (eto kak 
element povsednevnogo obshcheniia). It happens very often beginning 
with small details. It is difficult to tell examples, because it is so 
self-evident.
(marketing director, p6)
This section considers middlemen or brokers as another important 
social mechanism regulating transactions in personal networks. Brokers 
may, among other things, create trust between network members, 
transmit and evaluate resources circulating in networks, and enlarge 
the networks through the introduction of new members. In addition to 
these connective and collaborative functions, brokers may also try to 
use their position as middlemen between unconnected network mem-
bers to their own advantage.
According to our respondents, the inclination to use third persons in 
transmission or evaluation of resources is a conventional and routinized 
way of acting in the Russian business environment:13
According to my personal experience I can here [in Russia] freely 
phone a quite distant acquaintance, that is, someone whom I know 
well enough to phone, and ask him a favor or propose something. In 
Germany [where the respondent had worked] this is not as usual.
(general director, p4)
Recent research has emphasized that brokers do not only pass on 
resources but also participate actively in the process by adapting and 
refining them (Mustikkamäki 2008; Sverrisson 2001; Obstfeld 2005; 
Obstfeld and Borgatti 2008; see also Gould and Fernandez 1989).14 This 
active involvement is particularly important in the field of information 
technology where the transmission of information is often accompa-
nied by its sorting, filtering, and analysis. 
The first part of this section discusses the dividing and connecting 
aspects of brokerage on the basis of Ronald Burt’s and David Obstfeld’s 
120 Networks in the Russian Market Economy
theorizing. The remaining part focuses on the connecting and col-
laborative aspects of brokerage, illustrating them on the basis of our 
empirical data. 
The broker as divider and as connector
One of the central ideas concerning brokerage is the theory of structural 
holes by Ronald Burt (1992). According to David Obstfeld (2005) Burt’s 
theory is based on a variant of Georg Simmel’s idea of the tertius gaudens 
broker (third who gains), where the third person in a triad takes advan-
tage of the missing contact between the two other actors:
He [Burt] argued that social networks rich in structural holes present 
opportunities for using a tertius gaudens strategy, by which an actor 
positioned between two disconnected parties can manipulate or 
exploit those parties to the actor’s benefit.
(Obstfeld 2005: 103)
Though Obstfeld notes that Burt has also addressed a broader varia-
tion of triadic behaviors, structural hole theory concentrates on the 
separation of actors suggested in Simmel’s original usage. Burt’s theory 
is marked by competition, control, and conflicts, and his tertius gaudens 
broker attempts to profit from his position by keeping the triad’s other 
parts separate.
Unlike Burt’s, Obstfeld’s approach to brokerage builds on the tertius 
iungens (third who joins)15 – a non-competitive and non-adversarial 
‘behavioral orientation toward connecting people by either introducing 
disconnected individuals or facilitating new coordination between con-
nected individuals’ (Obstfeld 2005: 102; see also Obstfeld and Borgatti 
2008).16 
Obstfeld (2005) distinguishes four types of brokerage. The first type 
(conduit) refers to coordination of action or information between 
parties who have no immediate prospects for direct introduction or 
connection. The second type (tertius gaudens) contains Burt’s theory 
of structural holes. The third type (brief tertius iungens) introduces or 
facilitates ties between parties where a continuing coordinative role 
is unnecessary, diminishes in importance, or simply is not offered. 
The fourth type (sustained tertius iungens) introduces or facilitates 
interaction between parties while maintaining an essential coordina-
tive role. 
Obstfeld’s idea of tertius iungens does not, however, exclude the 
presence of structural holes – which would lead to completely closed 
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networks – because the introduction of new members to the network 
by a cooperative broker may, together with closing old structural holes, 
also create new holes. 
In brief, the viewpoints of Burt and Obstfeld shed light on the two 
sides of brokerage, competition and collaboration, both of which merit 
attention. In this section the focus is, in line with the main emphasis of 
this book, on the latter, particularly on the role of brokers in connect-
ing, transmitting, and evaluating resources circulating in the personal 
networks. 
The remaining two sections do not aim at a fine-grained conceptual 
analysis of different brokerage types or functions but rather try to illus-
trate the significance of middlemen in the Russian IT business through 
the examination of our empirical data. Particular focus is placed on the 
brokers’ role in recruiting employees, since competent staff was the 
most valuable and scarce resource in the St. Petersburg IT industry at 
the time of our interviews. 
Brokers as connectors
I simply have a huge database [of connections] in my head. Probably 
not in details, but I know how to connect people who can help each 
other.
(project leader, p26)
According to our respondents, brokerage chains and triads were com-
mon in IT business. The inclination to turn to middlemen for help 
was illustrated in the expressions used by our respondents, where the 
instances of brokerage were described as, for example, ‘self-evident’ 
or were considered part of ‘human communication’ (chelovecheskoe 
obshchenie), and contact information was actively transmitted within 
one’s personal network:
In my circle of communication (v kruge moego obshcheniia) we usually 
let each other know about useful contacts. All colleagues in this circle 
think like this: ‘I got to know an interesting person and for you it 
would be useful to talk with him’.
(general director, p7)
Through brokers the network ties transferred information about a wide 
variety of resources such as technologies, markets, and competition. 
Though contacts with customers were a heavily contested resource, 
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even they were at times transmitted from one firm to another provided 
that the firms were not active in the same markets: 
Q: Have you sometimes exchanged useful contacts through 
acquaintances?
P10: Of course. This is banal: two weeks ago I got a phone call from 
my acquaintance who is also working in the IT industry. His firm 
has a slightly different specialization. He was contacted concerning 
a project which is our specialty but not theirs. So he transmitted a 
contact with a potential customer.
(director, p10)
In the basic ‘brokerage triad’ between the donor, broker, and receiver, 
three different but interrelated ties will be born, in which the broker 
may function either as the third person introducing the donor and 
the receiver, or the guarantor of their interrelation, or both. In some 
cases these brokerage chains could grow long and complex. One of the 
respondents (director, p39) told about a phone call he got on a Sunday 
from his colleague ‘from a friendly company’. This colleague needed to 
find a programmer for his project that same day. Our respondent asked 
the colleague to describe the requirements of the job and turned then 
to his personal contact notebook which contained almost 200 names. 
The second broker in this transmission chain was our respondent’s 
acquaintance working in another firm, whom our respondent phoned 
explaining the problem:
He [the respondent’s acquaintance] said: ‘This is not my field. Phone 
N. N’. I phoned N. N. who said: ‘Yes this person exists but he is now 
devil knows where. You cannot reach him by phone, but he can be 
found through a third person’. (…) Finally, the person was found on 
Sunday, after three hours of searching.
(director, p39)
This quote is illustrative both of the dense networks between the 
managers of the St. Petersburg IT companies and of the speed and effi-
cacy of personal networks, but most importantly, of the inclination 
and willingness of all links in the search chain – including at least 
four professionals – to work as middlemen. This inclination is related 
to the ethics of helping out described in the previous sections and 
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forms an important aspect of the functioning of personal networks 
in Russia.
Brokers as evaluators
Brokers were central not only in transmitting and connecting, but also 
in evaluating various resources circulating in the networks. Among the 
most valuable and scarce resources were competent employees, whose 
assessment through networks will be at the center of this section. 
The particular significance of personal evaluations and recommenda-
tions in Russia may be understood against the lack or distrust of formal 
means and institutions of evaluation. Overcoming this distrust with the 
help of personal network ties was underlined by a 40-year-old company 
director who had conducted a survey about how customers had found 
their company. He illustrates the significance of trusted third persons 
with the following example:
If a person tells his friend that I’ve bought a TV set at this specific 
firm, his friend will go there automatically, without thinking, just 
trusting his friend. Even though this person may have bought his TV 
set there by chance, his friend will anyhow automatically also buy 
his TV set there. Provided, of course, that everything was OK with 
this firm. His friend will go there and the friend of his friend, and 
this chain will work on and on. [According to our customer survey] 
a significant percentage of our clients come here because of recom-
mendation from somebody. Moreover, when there is a personnel 
change in a [customer] company, the new employee will first see 
with whom the company has worked before. And if they’ve been 
happy, they will continue to work with us.
(director, p22)
The need for recommendations from a third person was even more 
acute in the field of IT services, where defining the quality of the 
services, products, or labor was a much more complex process than 
evaluating the quality of TV sets. Though international certification 
standards such as ISO9000 and CMM were referred to by some of our 
respondents,17 only a minority of small- or medium-sized firms have 
been granted these certifications.
The remaining text of this section focuses on the use of brokers in 
recruiting personnel which, at the time when our interviews were 
conducted, was the main problem for St. Petersburg IT firms. Despite 
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high-level theoretical knowledge, the graduates from the local universi-
ties lacked practical experience of, say, project management or language 
skills necessary for a successful career in the IT business, and the evalu-
ation of their de facto capacities was crucial for the employers.
When assessing the potential candidates for recruitment all informa-
tion available was used, including formal applications and written testi-
monials from previous workplaces. However, written testimonials could 
have strings attached. A good testimonial, for example, could turn out 
to be an attempt to save the face of an incompetent employee and avoid 
problems which would have resulted from his firing:
[Y]ou have to fire a person. He says OK, gets up, leaves his resignation 
of his own free will and saves his face. You will save his face. He could 
say that I won’t resign, fire me according to the laws. He takes the 
issue to court after which the real show begins. He will say that you 
are paying salaries under the counter. And you will say that I will send 
13-year-old hooligans to your home to explain to him where to look 
for his salary (…) who needs this? You will write him a letter of recom-
mendation (…) and he continues on the markets, shows the letter.
(general director, p3)
Moreover, in a formal testimonial the image given of the evaluation 
target is positive and flawless. The possible failures, conflicts, and other 
shortcomings at work have been excluded, whereas in an informal rec-
ommendation both pros and cons of the target can be dealt with.
Because a testimonial as a rule is written to an anonymous reader, it 
implies a different kind of responsibility than an informal recommenda-
tion given in a brokerage chain to an old acquaintance or friend: 
If for example one of my former employees is looking for job in some 
firm and asks for a recommendation (…) if he does not ask anything 
supernatural, I’ll write a recommendation regardless of how our work 
relationship ended. And I don’t feel any responsibility for it to other 
people (…) If I recommend to a friend, good acquaintance or my part-
ner a person whom I know personally, then I will bear a certain respon-
sibility for it. And therefore I think ten times, I weigh everything before 
I will give a recommendation. These are completely obvious things.
(general director, p4)
Therefore, when possible, an attempt was made to check the infor-
mation of the formal testimonial against the evidence obtained from 
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trusted third persons. In a typical case, the new employer would contact 
the former employer of the applicant to inquire about the background, 
trustworthiness, and competence of the employee:
If I see from the application that the applicant has worked, e.g., with 
Volkov [a well-known St. Petersburg IT entrepreneur – name has been 
changed], and I am not hiring a cleaner but a programmer, I will 
certainly phone Volkov and ask: Gennady Viktorovich, you had so-
and-so working for you. What can you tell me about him? ‘Nutcase’ 
(pridurok). Thanks a lot, Gennady Viktorovich.
(general director, p3)
In this example the written testimonial was bypassed in favor of a 
personal recommendation which was not made public: unlike formal 
evaluations, informal ones are often made orally and the persons evalu-
ated do not necessarily know about the contents of these assessments 
or even about their existence. 
Checking the background of the applicant over the phone was a com-
mon way of inquiring about the applicant’s character and competences. 
During one such conversation concerning an applicant, the advice 
given was ‘to chase him out with a broom’ (project leader, p24). 
However, informal recommendations were also evaluated critically 
and were cross-checked with different sources:
If I see from the applicant’s CV that he worked in a particular firm, 
it is very important for me to be able to phone some acquaintance 
in this firm and ask how things are with this person. Why did he 
leave the firm, what he was unhappy with, what are his weak and 
strong points? It is of course very important to talk directly with 
the employee because the information received from a third party is 
not always objective. Thus one shouldn’t blindly trust some recom-
mendations but always communicate directly with the person in 
question.
(technical director, p11)
Moreover, neither good informal recommendations nor testimonials 
will secure a job if the candidate does not pass the formal tests required, 
for example, to land a programming job.
In one company the applicants had to fill in a form where they 
were asked if they had acquaintances in the company. In the case of a 
positive reply, the recruiters turned to this acquaintance for additional 
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information ranging from the applicant’s professional competence to a 
detailed description of his personality: ‘This person is psychologically 
unstable. I studied with him at school and he used to throw paper balls 
at the teacher’ (PR-manager, p2).
In another company recruiting through networks was formalized in 
the form of a bonus paid to employees for bringing in a new worker. In 
this case the company’s employee functioned as a broker responsible for 
the new candidate:
If I recruit staff through my own employees the one who brings in 
a new person is personally responsible for him to me. The employee 
is still my subordinate and thereby bound to me ‘by blood’ (po krovi 
poviazan). If I recruit an employee through acquaintances and am 
unsatisfied with him, I am forced either to cut my relations with this 
acquaintance or carry that burden (derzhat’ kamen’ za pazuhoi) for 
the rest of my life.
(general director, p7)
While employers tried to evaluate the competences of the potential 
employees, the employees themselves were simultaneously turning to 
third persons to evaluate the quality of the employers. Because of the 
mobility of the workforce and the relatively small size of St. Petersburg 
markets, the reputation of both employers and employees spread 
quickly through networks:
Q: How important are social networks to the formation of a person’s 
reputation?
P11. Extremely important. Particularly important is the lack of nega-
tive information. Negative information about the company or the 
director may stain the project right away. It will be more difficult to 
find staff if it is commonly known that the company does not treat 
employees fairly. This information will quite soon become common 
knowledge.
Q: And will be particularly damaging for recruiting?
P11: Of course. Such negative information is spread primarily 
through acquaintances. It is not usually published and therefore you 
can find negative information only through acquaintances.
(technical director, p11)
In sum, the role of brokers was central both in introducing new mem-
bers to personal networks and evaluating the resources circulating in 
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them. Inclination to turn to brokers and willingness to act as one were 
marked features of the Russian managers’ activities. The role of brokers 
was further emphasized by the lack and distrust of formal systems of 
evaluation and was facilitated by the relatively small circles within the 
industry. 
The mixing of personal and professional spheres of life
This section describes how the personal and professional spheres of life 
get intertwined in Russian managers’ networks. This mixing was due to 
both the historical development of the Russian IT field discussed in pre-
vious chapters and more general cultural factors related to the Russian 
workplace. Once established, this intertwining affected the ways trans-
actions were conducted. 
The main focus of this section is on strong ties, particularly the ties 
of friendship, and their mixing with the economic activities of our 
respondents. The remaining text analyzes both the advantages and the 
problems and tensions caused by the efforts to combine friendship and 
business.
The role of strong ties in the Russian ICT business
As described in the previous chapter, for a Russian entrepreneur just 
starting out it was a natural choice to turn to personal network members 
such as kin, family, or friends in order to start up a firm, arrange start-
ing capital, and recruit personnel (cf. Oleinik 2004: 88). Several of our 
respondents had indeed built their companies upon this kind of ‘strong 
ties’ (Granovetter 1973) which in itself had contributed to the dissolving 
of the boundary between personal and professional spheres of life. 
The roots of this mixing can be traced back to the cultural aspects 
of the Soviet workplace, which regulated most aspects of the citizens’ 
daily life, including those which in Western countries were considered 
‘private’. It is not coincidental that the Soviet workplace was sometimes 
dubbed ‘second home’ (vtoroi dom) by workers and the relations within 
the ‘labor collective’ (trudovoi kollektiv) in many ways mixed with other 
aspects of life. 
Though in many ways different from the Soviet era, some of the 
cultural meanings and practices have been carried over to post-Soviet 
workplaces, and studies of the workplace as the nexus of social life in 
post-Soviet Russia have found a strong overlap between the personal 
and public spheres (Lonkila 1998, 2010; Lonkila and Salmi 2005). 
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Similar to these studies, our data illustrates how having people at 
work who were not only colleagues but also kin, friends, or good 
acquaintances extended work-connected favors to other areas of life.18 
In the company of one of our respondents, which belonged to the 
group of the most central software firms in St. Petersburg it was, for 
example, a customary practice to borrow discount cards for shopping 
from one’s colleagues:
I guess that every person has some kind of discount cards for vari-
ous shops, furniture, home appliances and so on. There are a lot of 
these cards but everyone does not have a card for every shop. Before 
we had a quite common practice that an employee planning to buy 
a bed, for example, would turn to the management asking informa-
tion about who in our firm would have a discount card for Maksidom. 
And often it happened that there was such a person: ‘Yes, Boris, go 
to the office 402, your card is waiting for you’. At some point of time 
we understood that we had to organize this information because 
there were so many letters coming in. Thus we published informa-
tion in our company intranet about all cards owned by the firm 
employees, naturally hoping that no single person would be too 
much bothered.
Another respondent (project leader, p26) whose girlfriend worked for 
the same company turned to his boss in order to find a loan to buy 
an apartment. Other examples of mutual help crossing the borders of 
the professional and personal spheres of life, such as borrowing a col-
league’s car or loaning money, abounded in the interviews and were 
likely to affect the nature of our respondents’ economic activities.
The importance of friendship
In addition to showing up in the respondents’ life stories recorded 
in the interviews, the mixing of close relationships, particularly 
friendship, with business ties also emerged in the online survey data (see 
section on data collection). Quite surprisingly, given the instrumental 
formulation of the survey questions,19 the characterizations by Russian 
respondents contained a lot of morally and emotionally loaded descrip-
tions, for example, ‘friend and colleague, consults me on work matters’, 
‘boss and a good friend’, ‘we are good family friends, we spend spare 
time together, play football’, ‘my boss and simply a good person’, ‘good 
and understanding friend, we are working on some projects together’, 
and so forth. Particularly interesting was the share of characterizations 
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describing the emotional closeness between the respondent and his 
network members or the moral qualities of the latter. 
These characterizations suggest that friendship ties were strongly 
present also in the professional life of the Russian IT managers. This 
observation was supported by the fact that, of all social ties useful for 
business or career reported by the respondents, 22 percent were friend-
ship relations. Moreover, 62 percent of all respondents recorded at least 
one friend in their personal network.20 
In themselves, these figures seem to testify to the importance of 
friendship relations – and thus also to the mixing of professional and 
personal spheres of life. But we also conducted an analysis of all rela-
tionship descriptions that implied a crisscrossing of the borders of per-
sonal and public spheres of life. Because the survey question inquired 
about the help received in the context of professional activities, each 
instance of friendship or kin (‘pleasant acquaintances’ – priiateli and 
acquaintances were not included) was counted as an instance of this 
blurring of boundaries by definition. To them were added other kinds 
of descriptions in which boundary crossing was clearly indicated, such 
as ‘work and personal relationship’, ‘more than just a director’, ‘we play 
football together’, and so forth. Altogether 108 such descriptions (31 
percent of all ties) were found, lending further credence to the mixing 
of the spheres.
Finally, when 40 network structures reported by the respondents were 
selected for closer inspection, the role of friendship in the support 
networks of the Russian managers turned out to be even more vital.21 
When the number of ties involving at least one friend at the other end 
(or both ends) was calculated relative to all ties in the network, the 
average indication of the structural importance of friends in the networks 
was on average around 60 percent, reaching 100 percent for nine net-
works. 
This is not to say that all St. Petersburg firms are populated by kin 
and friends or that friendship ties in business are necessarily only a 
Russian particularity. On the contrary, several studies (e.g. Dulsrud and 
Grønhaug 2007; Halpern 1994; Ingram and Roberts 2000; Kadushin 
1995) point to the importance of the role of friendship also in Western 
economic life.22 The mere number of the relations, however, is not 
enough to make conclusions about the significance of these ties, 
since the meaning of friendship varies between cultures (Fischer 1982; 
Castrén and Lonkila 2004; Kharkhordin 2005). In other words, Russian 
friends may expect different kinds of behavior from each other than 
American or Finnish friends. For instance, helping out a friend seems to 
130 Networks in the Russian Market Economy
be constitutive of the Russian friendship relation to a different degree 
than in Finland.23 
Having friends as colleagues, bosses, business partners, principals, or 
clients may be both a blessing and a curse. The remaining text of this 
chapter analyzes the pros and cons of combining business and friendship.
Combining friendship with business
When we asked about possible conflicts between friendship and busi-
ness, managers’ replies revealed the complex relation between these two 
kinds of social tie.24 
First, some respondents distinguished strictly between friendship and 
business (‘the best way to get rid of a friend is to lend him money’). In 
this case the worlds of friendship and business were clearly separated 
(Dulsrud and Grønhaug 2007). 
Second, respondents emphasized the positive aspects of friendship 
for business. The trust inherent in friendship can, for example, help in 
work tasks which otherwise might require complicated arrangements. 
In cases of possible conflict, finding a compromise with a good friend 
might be easier because of a common past and shared worldview. 
Third, respondents questioned – similar to the replies to the question 
on reciprocity – the generalization implied by the question. In this case 
respondents started reflecting upon the combination of friendship and 
business in relation to the situation and person in question. Thus, the 
reply to the question of whether it is possible to combine friendship 
and business would be ‘that depends on the friend and the situation’. 
A good friend might be, because of his disorganized character or other 
features, completely unsuitable for business: 
P5: I find it is stereotypical to think that friendship and work fit 
poorly together. There are many practical considerations related to 
this. On the other hand we have live examples of how good friends 
run businesses together very successfully. I think this depends a lot 
on the people.
Q: In which way?
P5. Punctuality, organized character. A person could be your friend 
but not necessarily a well-organized and good business partner.
(development director, p5)
Fourth, the success of the ‘marriage’ between business and friendship 
was considered to depend on the sequential order in which they were 
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born. As described above, in many cases firms were established on the 
basis of an existing friendship relation or network:
Q: Do you know if the owners of your firm are friends?
P6: Yes.
Q: Were they friends already before starting business?
P6: Yes. This is not an individual example. For instance the firm of 
my husband was established originally by a small group of enthusi-
asts (…) they all know each other and are friends. 
(marketing director, p6)
Since friendship contains elements, such as trust, which are beneficial 
in running a company, building a firm upon a circle of friends, kin, and 
acquaintances was not an uncommon way to establish an IT business 
in St. Petersburg during the 1990s. But sometimes these two ties may 
come into conflict, as in a case where friends disagree upon an impor-
tant decision:
Q: How in your opinion do business and friendship fit together? 
Have you been in situations where there was a conflict between 
friendship and business? 
P1: I have been lucky not to be in such a situation. Though the present 
managing director and partner is our good friend. But I know several 
cases where friendship and business disturb each other.
Q: Why?
P1. Because often it is a question about a decision made by one per-
son. (…) In business there are situations when one person has to be 
leader and sometimes this causes conflicts. In friendship it is difficult 
to be a leader.
(general director, p1)
In the worst possible cases, the emerging disagreement may end with 
the destruction of the friendship tie or business, or both. It may, to take 
a concrete example, be a rational decision to fire an incompetent busi-
ness partner-friend. 
Generally I think that one should not work with friends. If you, for 
example, get into a situation, and these situations occur often, when 
you will have to fire your best friend (…) I got into exactly such a 
situation.
(technical director, p11)
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One of our respondents referred to business as an ongoing ‘test’ (ispy-
tanie) for friendship. In his opinion, friends doing business together 
have to be on guard all the time, because of the fragility of this com-
bination:
Q: How in general do friendship and business relate to each other? 
Have you been in a situation where they got into conflict? 
P10: (…) business is quite a test for friendship (ispytanie dlia druzhby). 
Many passed the test but many did not, and either friendship or 
business crashed. (…) it is a difficult test (tiazheloe ispytanie). I have 
at the moment no conflicts between friendship and business, but if 
you are conducting business with friends you have to be constantly 
ready that it will lead to conflict. The same with family relations. 
Some think that it is a bad idea to conduct business with your wife. 
But there are situations where it works well. 
(director, p10)
The respondent does not detail the nature of the test. But this could 
mean, for example, giving a customer-friend credit without guarantees, 
or not demanding written, formal contracts which could be interpreted 
as a lack of trust between friends.
Unlike in previous examples, friendships could also be built upon 
already existing business relationships. Some respondents considered this 
variation easier than the preceding one: 
In my opinion if a good business exists, a friendship will be born. 
The other way around is rarer and that’s why I try to avoid building 
business with friends.
(general director, p7)
Another respondent supported this reflection by warning against start-
ing a business with someone only because he is a friend. It may be pleas-
ant to drink beer with a friend, but besides this, he may turn out to be 
a useless business partner:
But the other way around [turning business into friendship] – as 
much as you like. You can have a great time working together and in 
addition you may also spend free time together.
(director, p39)
This difference may be due to asymmetric dynamics of transforma-
tion of the ties. Trying to turn a business relationship into friendship, 
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the first type of tie is more or less conditioned by calculative rational-
ity. Dissolving these conditions may happen by giving up the formal 
practices step by step (‘I trust you as an old buddy so I won’t ask for 
guarantees for this loan’). In this case a limited tie will be gradually 
transformed into a more diffuse one. 
The reverse transformation will impose limits on the diffuse friend-
ship tie (for example, the friends will be forced to formalize their rela-
tionship in a written contract). Sometimes this may lead to complete 
revaluation of the relationship and breaking up of the friendship.
Combining friendship and business ties may thus strengthen a rela-
tionship but may also create tensions. For our online survey respond-
ents, these tensions are all the more serious considering both the long 
duration of the reported friendship ties in the web survey data – 19 years 
on average – and the particular role of friendship in Russian culture.25 
In all, this chapter analyzed the functioning of social mechanisms 
and practices governing network exchanges in the Russian software 
industry. It showed how economically relevant resources are not only 
channeled and evaluated through middlemen, but that transactions 
also include a moral domestic element alternative to market-based 
logic. Combining this domestic logic, ties of friendship, and the new 
world of market competition is a potential source of conflicts between 
the two sometimes-contradictory worlds.
The chapter also illustrated the complex interplay of the Soviet past 
and the post-Soviet present addressed in previous chapters. The role of 
strong ties, for example, cannot be only conceived of as a Soviet legacy 
since it was also a solution to the problem of trust in the turbulent con-
ditions in the 1990s in Russia.
In sum, the present-day Russian market economy seems to lean in 
many ways on the functioning of personal networks and the domestic 
logic of action. The next chapter will analyze if this could be a basis for 
generalizing the value of particular and trusted links to any potential 
new relationship as suggested by Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello in 
their account of the ‘new spirit of capitalism’.
